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child whom (along with the wife) the husband refused to support, even
though he was able to. The wife instituted a divorce proceeding in which
she prayed for support money and custody of the child. The district court
refused the divorce but retained the case in order to dispose of matters
relating to the child. The court eventually awarded the custody of the
child to the wife and ordered the father to pay $10 per month for the
child's support. The Supreme Court, in upholding this action of the
district court ,held that the lower court had the powers of a court of equity
to determine the custody of the child; and that it also had jurisdiction, by
virtue of Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, sec. 3-5919 (supra), to entertain a proceeding by a wife to compel the husband to support the minor child when
both husband and wife are separated. Here is a case where our Supreme
Court approved an order for future support even though both spouses
were still married. The situation embraced by sec. 3-5919 is very much
akin to that covered by sec. 58-215. In the former, the husband has refused
to support his wife and children when both spouses are separated. In the
latter, the husband refuses to support his wife and children after he has
deserted them. In both cases, the husband is living apart from his wife
and children and refuses to support them. If the situation covered by
sec. 3-5919 can be remedied by an order for future support, it would seem
that, in light of Urbach v.Urbach, the situation covered by sec. 58-215 can
also be remedied in the same manner.
In conclusion, sec. 58-215 represents the most recent attempt by the
Wyoming legislature to effectively cope with the problem of an everincreasing number of ADC cases, and the other problem of providing those
who care for the chlidren with an effective means of relieving themselves,
to some extent, of the burden of support. This is in harmony with the
current trend of assisting the supporting parent or third person with a
means of reducing their burden of support. The trend, standing in sharp
contrast with the reluctance of the old common law courts to enforce the
parental duty of support, is indicative of the new responses of the legislatures
and cburts to changing social conditions. In making such responses, legislatures and courts have given new meaning and vitality to the statement of
Justice Holmes that "the life of the law has not been logic; it has been
experience."
JAMES ROBERT MOTHERSHEAD

THE UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT

AcT Iw

WYOMING

"Mary Doe consulted me today", the lawyer's memorandum read, "and
told me the following story: Mrs. Doe said she was married and the mother
of'three children, Jimmy 7, Johnny 5, and Susie 1. Her husband, John,
lived with the family here in Sagebrush, Wyoming, until a few months ago,
when he left unexpectedly. Although he had a good job with the Buildem
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Construction Company, he was a heavy drinker, and the family barely eked
out an existence. He had not been heard of until yesterday, when Mrs. Doe
learned from an acquaintance that he is now employed as a roughneck in
the Rangely Oil Field in Colorado. From the time he left, she and the
family have been on county welfare, and to supplement this meager
income she has done small sewing jobs. She has received no support from
her husband since he left, and is unaware that she has any remedy to
compel payment of support from him, but came to the office because a
friend suggested that she consult a lawyer."
Mrs. Doe's problem is an important one-to her and other women in
similar situations, and to the State of Wyoming, which pays large sums
each month to support such indigent families as this.
If you were the lawyer who had written the hypothetical memorandum
we have just quoted, how would you advise your client, Mrs. Doe? Of
course you might suggest that arrangements be made with a Colorado
attorney, leading to the institution of an action against John Doe, the
"runaway pappy", in Colorado. Problems of expense and delay would
immediately arise, both difficult of solution in a typical case of this sort.
In addition, there may be some difficulty in persuading a Colorado court
to enforce a Wyoming non-support claim.1
Fortunately, Mrs. Doe has another remedy. Both Wyoming and
Colorado legislatures have adopted the Uniform Enforcement of Support
Act, 2 which is directed at just such situations as have been described.
You would best serve her interests and the interests of her children
by filing a petition 8 in the District Court of the County in which Sagebrush
is located, requesting therein that the court appoint you as counsel. 4 The
petition would set out the facts with respect to the Doe family and the
defendant's (John Doe's) failure to support his family. If the petition
appeared to indicate that John owed a duty of support, the Wyoming
District Court would certify to that effect, and would send copies of the
petition, the Wyoming Uniform Enforcement of Support Act, and its
certificate to the District Court of the County wherein John is living in
Colorado. 5
As to the duty arising while John Doe resided in Wyoming, Mr.
Mothershead's article on "Enforcement of Civil Liability for Nonsupport
in the State of Wyoming", appearing in this symposium issue, should be
consulted.
.
2.

3.
4.
5.

See 11 Am. Jur. 325.
Wyoming Session Laws, 1951,
86, as amended. (These now
References to these statutes
Colorado Sesion Laws, 1951,
1953, Chapter 229.
Sec. 3-8110.
Sec. 3-8111.
Sec. 3-8113.

Chapter 86, and Wyoming Session Laws, 1953, Chapter
appear as Wyo. Comp. Stats., 1945, Secs. 3-8101 to 8129.
hereinafter will be made by section number only).
Chapter 151, as amended by Colorado Session Laws,

NoTEs

"The Colorado District Court would docket the case, appoint an
attorney to represent John, set a time and place for a hearing, and obtain
jurisdiction over John by service of process upon him in accordance with
Colorado practice.8
John would then be presented with two atlernatives: (1) he might
not submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court, in which case extradition proceedings may be commenced in Wyoming under Section 3-8105
for criminal non-support, or, (2) if he did submit himself, and complied
7
If
with the orders of the Colorado Court, extradition would be waived.
the Colorado court found a duty of support, then it could order John to
support, or to reimburse the Wyoming Welfare Department for support
which it had supplied to the Doe family, and could subject John's Colorado
property (including his salary from the oil company) to the order.8 If all
went well, Mrs. Doe could expect shortly to receive payments from John
made to the Colorado court and transmitted through the Clerk of the
Wyoming District Court;9 for if he failed to carry out the orders of the
Colorado Court he could be held in contempt. 10 The Colorado Court
could require him to post bond or make a cash deposit to insure payments,
and could order the payments to be made at specified periods to the clerk
of the Wyoming Court."
There are a number of other features of the Act worth special comment. If Mrs. Doe were disinclined to institute proceedings thereunder,
the Welfare Department could do so. 12 The Act does not displace other
remedies, but is supplemental thereto.' 3 The Doe proceeding could cover
duties of support arising under Colorado law, during the period subsequent
to John's removal to that state, as well as duties arising under Wyoming
law while he was a Wyoming resident. 14 Costs, fees, and stenographic
expense connected with the proceeding may be imposed upon the defendant, or waived by the courts involved, although no filing fee is required
to commence the action. '1 If the Wyoming court believes John Doe may
flee the Colorado jurisdiction, it may request (and the Colorado court may
comply) that John be restrained from leaving the Colorado jurisdiction by
appropriate process such as writ of ne exeat. 16 (This is an excellent provision). Husband-wife testimonial privileges are made inapplicable to
proceedings under the Act,' 7 otherwise the rules of evidence are those which
6.

Sec. 3-8117.

7.
8.

Sec. 3-8106.
Sec. 3-8120.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Secs. 3-8123 and 3-8124.
Sec. 3-8122 (c).
Sec. 3-8122(a) and (b).
Sec. 3-8108.
Sec. 3-8103.
Sec. 3-8107.
Sec. 3-8114.
Sec. 3-8115.
Sec. 3-8125.
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bind the Juvenile Court.1 8 The extradition features appearing in Sections
3-8105 and 3-8106 are good, although even as modified by those sections
extradition will still be somewhat complex. Section 10-2403 provides, for
example, that an indictment or information shall accompany the request
for extradition.
As of the date of this writing, forty-one states have adopted this or a
similar Act 19-all except Arizona, Florida, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, Vermont, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia.
This Act traces its lineage back to 1910, when the Commissioners of
Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform Desertion and Support Act.
This piece of legislation was passed by 24 jurisdictions, but its powers were
circumscribed. Its sanctions were criminal only, and it did not reach
husbands and fathers who had fled the state.
The present Uniform Enforcement of Support Act was adopted in
Washington, D. C., in September, 1950, by the American Bar Association
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
Wyoming's adoption came in 1951. The rapidity of its adoption indicates
widespread recognition of the need for some solution of the "runaway
pappy" problem. The amendments which were made in 1953 were primarily additions, and were adopted by many states (including Wyoming) upon
the recommendations of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
There have been several objections to the Act asserted on constitutional
grounds. In November, 1953, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky considered many constitutional objections, and overruled them all, in the case
of Duncan, County Attorney v. Smith.20 As of the date of this writing the
Duncan case appears to be the first and only case construing the Act which
has been decided by a court of last resort. The constitutional objections

raised and passed upon in the Duncan case are as follows:
(1) That the Act is so vague, indefinite and uncertain as to be incapable of enforcement.
In particular it was contended that the definition of "court" in
section
2(4) 21 fell within this category.
argument.

The court made short shrift of this

(2) That the Act diverts funds for the benefit of private individuals.
The Kentucky Constitution provides that taxes shall be levied and
collected for public purposes only. To the same effect is Art. 16, Sec. 6
of the Wyoming Constitution. Those challening the Act urged that, in
requiring the County Attorney-a public official-to represent "private
18.

Sec. 3-8126.

19.

See 45 11. Law Review 252 (1950), concerning the New York type Act which has
been adopted by several states.
262 S.W.2d 375 (1955).
Sec. 3-8104 (4) of the Wyoming Act.

20.
21.

NoTms
persons in private lawsuits" the Act works a diversion of public funds for
private individuals. The court in answer said:
"The argument gives us no concern. The payment of public
funds to needy individuals has been upheld as being for public
purposes. Bowman v. Frost, 289 Ky. 826, 158 S.W.2d 945. It
would seem to be immaterial whether aid to the needy takes the
form of cash payments or of services by public officials ...
Furthermore, if it is proper for public prosecutors to be required
to maintain criminal prosecutions for desertion or nonsupport,
there is no apparent reason why they cannot be required to assist
in enforcing civil liability for support: In both instances the objective is to coerce the husband or father to comply with an obligation
which otherwise would fall on the public generally."
In this connection it is proper to note that the Wyoming Constitutional
provision forbidding the state or any subdivision to "make donations to
or in aid in any individual, association or corporation" is immedately followed by the words "except for necessary support of the poor."
(3) That the Act is extraterritorialin its operation.
The argument here was that the Act purports to give Kentucky courts
jurisdiction outside the State, and to give foreign courts jurisdiction
within Kentucky. The court replied that the Act, like all reciprocal legislation, merely provides what Kentucky courts may do in Kentucky, and that
any powers exercised by foreign courts in other states are exercised by the
reciprocal laws of such other states and not by virtue of the Kentucky Act.
"The Court of the initiating state exercises no jurisdiction
over the respondent, but merley serves as a local agency of convenience for the court of the responding state."
The opinion pointed out that in any "ordinary action" a petition may be
filed in a Kentucky court without the petitioner being physically present
there.
(4) That the Act constitutes a compact between States, and requires
the consent of Congress under Art. I, Sec. 10 of the Federal Constitution.
As to this contention the court observed:
"The simple answer to this is that the Act does not bear any
of the aspects of an agreement or contract between Kentucky and
and other state. Kentucky is free to repeal the Act at any time.
Furthermore, the Act does not constitute 'the formation of any
combination tending to the increase of political power in the
states' which was laid down as the measure of a compact in State
of Virginia v. State of Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 13 S.Ct. 728, 734,
37 L. Ed. 537."
(5) That the Act violates the privileges and immunities clause of
Art. IV,Sec. 2 of the Federal Constitution.
The court found no merit in this contention, because the Act grants
the some privileges to citizens of other states as it does to citizens of
Kentucky.
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(6) That the Act violates the equal protection clause of the Federal
and State Constitutions.
This ground of challenge was based on the grant of free representation
to a dependent person when the obligor is in another state, but the absence
of such grant when the obligor is in Kentucky. The court met it by finding
that the practical difficulties involved in securing support from one
residing in another state constitute a valid basis for granting free legal
representation in that situation and denying it in cases where both obligor
and obligee reside in the same state; i.e., these provision of the Act represent
a reasonable classification. The court added that:
". .. in the final analysis, the free legal representation is for
the benefit of the public as a whole, and not of the particular
dependent person."
(7) That the Act violates the state constitutional provision against
a law being enacted to take effect upon the approval of any authority other
than the legislature.
The Act cannot take effect, it was argued, until some other state
enacts a similar law. Here again is an objection which might be made to
any reciprocal law, and which has been frequently answered by pointing
out that a legislature may enact a law to take effect only when and if
certain conditions arise. In this instance the condition is the enactment
of a similar law by another state. The Kentucky law then becomes effective not by virtue of the voice of a foreign legislature, but by virtue of
the legislative will of Kentucky.
The Kentucky constitutional provision involved in this contention
appears to have no exact counterpart in the constitution in Wyoming.
(8) That the Act violates the provisions of the Federal and State
Constitutions forbidding criminal punishment without an opportunity to
the accused to confront the witnesses against him.
The Sixth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution was relied upon in
this contention. The Kentucky and Wyoming constitutions contain similar
provisions, that of Wyoming being Art. 1, Sec. 10. It was contended that
certain of the penalties of the Act were in the nature of criminal punishment, in particular the provisions of what is Sec. 3-8122 (c) of the Wyoming
Act,' which confers power upon the court of the responding state to punish
the obligor for contempt of court, in event he should violate any order of
the court. To this the court replied that the proceeding is civil, not
criminal, and that the contempt punishment is not for a crime, but only
for the purpose of coercing compliance with the orders of the court. The
Kentucky court pointed to the everyday use of the contempt process to
enforce orders for support and alimony in divorce cases.
The list of constitutional objections in Duncan v. Smith seems exhaustive, and the answers given by the court convincing, with the possible
exception of the make-weight observation of the court in answer to con-

NOTES

tention (2) that "if it is proper for public prosecutors to be required to
maintain criminal prosecutions for desertion or non-support, there is no
apparent reason why they cannot be required to assist in enforcing civil
liability for support." It is submitted that this statement is a non sequitur;
however, the court's postion on contention (2) is amply supported without
it.

In addition to problems of constitutionality the Act present various
administrative problems. For example, any Uniform Act may run into
difficulties caused by divergent interpretations by the different adopting
states. Sometimes common law precedents stand in the way of uniform
administration. There is some confusion arising from the co-existence of
the Uniform Desertion and Support Act and the Uniform Enforcement
of Support Act. The former is in operation in some few states and is commonly referred to as the New York type act. 22 Support duties vary from
state to state; some states enforce duty to illegitimate children while others
do not; some jurisdictions require support of parents and others do not;
a dozen states require support as between brother and sister; 17 states require
a wife to support a husband under certain conditions. The duty to support
children ranges from 14-21.23
tion.

On the whole, there is much to be said in favor of this type of legislaT every state having the Act will conscientiously enforce it, much

can be accomplished. Prior to 1951, Mrs. Doe had at best a criminal
remedy against her husband, which only indirectly produced results so far
as actual money is concerned, and which was only intrastate in extent.
Now, thanks to the Act, she has a direct, interstate method of enforcing
payment of family support.
Desertions cost the United States at least $205,000,000 in 1949-this
is the amount paid out by relief agencies to support families whose breadwinner had left.24 Other desertions not included in this relief figure
would swell it substantially. In November, 1953 ,the figure for welfare
payments in desertion cases in Wyoming was $6,544, and affected 151
children. 25 Projecting these figures over a 12 month period, the total
would be $78,528. In 1950, the delinquent parent was out of the state,
or his whereabouts unknown, in about 70% of the Aid to Dependent
26
If
Children cases which were due to desertion, separation, or divorce.
only a part of the national and state payments were recoverable, there would
be considerable saving in money.
22.

23.

Sup.ra, note 9.

As pointed out elsewhere in this issue, there appears to be a difference as to what
is a dependent child in Wyoming; cf. Secs. 58-606 and 25-101, Wyo. Comp. Stat.,
1945. If there is an implied repeal then 25-101 is the statute in force since it is

later in date.
24.
25.
26.

Statistical Abstract of the United States, p. 247 (1951).
Letter received by the writer from E. H. Scheuneman, Director of the State Department of Public Welfare of Wyoming, dated December 28, 1955.
Report of Wyoming Taxpayers Assn., "Aid to Dependent Children in Wyoming",
January, 1953.
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Even without the benefit of the Act, time and energy invested by
prosecuting attorneys in criminal nonsupport cases will pay dividends.
In the City and County of Denver, Colorado, for example, as a result of
the assignment of a deputy prosecutor to such cases, nonsupport collections
by the Probation Department increased from $8,070 in 1949 to $60,960
in 1953.27 The District Attorney reported 497 cases had been filed against
deserting fathers who failed to support their children during the period
September 1, 1949 to September 1, 1953. During the same period, 295
fathers were arrested in 26 states other than Colorado. That this activity
has produced a salutary effect upon Denver "runaway pappys" is evidenced
by the fact that arrests of absconding fathers dropped from 54, during the
four month period beginning with September 1, 1949, to 58 for the entire
year of 1953.
It has been estimated that more than 25% of the children in orphanages
28
in the U. S. as public charges are not orphans, but deserted children.
The connection between broken homes and juvenile delinquency has been
too well established to require comment. The Act will tend to cut down
all of these figures, and will tend to discourage desertions and reunite
families. For all of these reasons it must be regarded as a major step in
social legislation.
In Wyoming, activity under the Act has been slow to begin, but there
are indications that those involved are becoming increasingly aware of its
potentials. There have been as yet no decisions of the Supreme Court of
Wyoming involving the Act. The writer has recently communicated with
the nine district judges of the state, and has received replies from six of
them. At the times of writing, none of the judges had decided a case under
the Act, but there were a number of cases pending in most Districts. It is
hoped that the Act will be used with increasing frequency. Through its
use, those able but unwilling to meet their support responsibilities can
often by "brought to time", with corresponding benefits to Mary Doe and
the taxpayers.
RoGER MCKENZIE
27.
28.

Rocky Mt. News of February 23, 1954.
Zeinser, Family Desertions: Some International Aspects of the Problem, 6 Social
Service Review No. 2 (1932).

